

ECOFIN
Economic and Financial

VANMUN 2023

“Discussion on the economic implications and economic recovery from the crisis in Libya”

Letter from the EB

It is our pleasure to welcome you all to the Economic and Financial Council in this edition of VANMUN. I will be chairing this council alongside our amazing chairs Narayan and Sandhya, and we hope that you guys don't just learn but also have fun and maybe teach us a thing or two along the way. Now, since the conference is offline there are so many things that can make it an interactive and enjoyable one, but don't worry about that, this is something we should be thinking about. For this edition of the conference, we here at the Economic and Financial Council will be discussing economic implications and economic recovery from the crisis in Libya, there is a lot we have to discuss about here and we hope that this little document that we made provides you a little insight on what can be discussed in committee, also note that your debate can be based on but not limited to the agendas provided in the study guide.

The only piece of advice I think I am capable of giving everyone here is that "You are just one speech away from realising how great of a speaker you are and how great of a diplomat you are". I would encourage you all to give at least one speech here even if it's your first conference, and always remember mistakes are what make you, you. I wish you the best of luck and hope that I am able to make this conference memorable for you all. Also delegates, remember that if you need any guidance or have any queries, I am just a click away, feel free to contact me, I will be adding my contact info below.

A delegate represents the country in the UN and defends it. The delegate acts in the best interest of the country. Being able to represent a country in the UN is an honour and privilege bestowed upon the delegate by the country. A few tips that you may find helpful:

Be more attentive during the session

Research in general is very important for a delegate to appear competent

Maintain decorum while the committee is in motion

It is always nice to be helpful and kind to the other delegates

Speak clearly and ensure that you are audible to everyone in the committee

Refrain from talking to other delegates when the committee is in motion

Good luck once again delegates!

Sincerely,

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Introduction to the Committee

The Economic and Financial Council, commonly known as ECOFIN, is one of the principal organs of the United Nations (UN). As a central platform for international economic cooperation and development, it plays a crucial role in addressing global economic challenges and advancing sustainable development worldwide.

Mandate of the Economic and Financial Council of the UN:

1. **Economic Cooperation:** ECOFIN serves as a forum for member states to discuss and coordinate international economic policies. It facilitates dialogue and collaboration among governments, organizations, and stakeholders to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, and the achievement of the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
2. **Development Coordination:** ECOFIN oversees and coordinates the work of UN agencies, programs, and funds related to economic and social development. It ensures coherence and effectiveness in their efforts, promotes policy integration, and avoids duplication of work. It plays a crucial role in aligning the work of various UN entities with global development priorities.
3. **Policy Guidance:** ECOFIN provides policy guidance and recommendations on economic, social, and environmental issues to member states and the UN system. It examines major development challenges, identifies emerging trends, and formulates policy frameworks and strategies to address them. Its policy guidance aims to foster global cooperation, promote sustainable development, and tackle systemic issues affecting the global economy.
4. **International Cooperation:** ECOFIN promotes international cooperation and partnerships to advance sustainable development. It encourages collaboration among governments, civil society organizations, and the private sector to mobilize resources, share knowledge, and implement sustainable development initiatives. It also engages with regional organizations and promotes dialogue and cooperation at the international level.

5. **Financing for Development:** ECOFIN plays a key role in the financing for development process. It facilitates discussions on innovative financing mechanisms, international aid, debt relief, and financial resources mobilization for development purposes. It supports efforts to improve the flow of financial resources to developing countries and advocates for a fair and inclusive global economic system.
6. **Follow-up and Review:** ECOFIN monitors the progress of member states in implementing their commitments related to sustainable development. It conducts regular reviews, including the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, to assess progress, share experiences, and promote accountability. Its review mechanisms help identify challenges, best practices, and areas requiring further attention in achieving sustainable development goals.

Introduction to the Agenda

The crisis in Libya has had profound economic implications, severely impacting the country's stability and development. The ongoing conflict, which began in 2011 with the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime, has left Libya grappling with political fragmentation, security challenges, and economic disarray. This discussion aims to shed light on the economic consequences of the crisis and explore potential pathways for economic recovery in Libya.

One of the major economic implications of the crisis has been the decline in oil production. Libya possesses vast oil reserves, and oil exports have historically been the backbone of its economy. However, due to the conflict, oil production and exports have experienced significant disruptions, leading to a sharp decline in government revenues and foreign exchange earnings. The destruction of critical infrastructure is another consequence of the crisis. The conflict has resulted in the damage of vital infrastructure such as oil facilities, ports, and transportation networks. This destruction has hindered the country's ability to revive economic activities, impeding the flow of goods and services both domestically and internationally.

The prolonged crisis has also led to a shrinking private sector. Domestic and foreign investments have been deterred, resulting in a contraction of the private sector. Many businesses have been forced to close, leading to

widespread unemployment and poverty. The absence of a robust private sector further weakens the country's economic prospects. Moreover, the crisis has created a significant humanitarian burden, with large-scale internal displacement and a rise in the number of refugees and migrants. The strain on social services and resources has further strained the economy, as the government struggles to meet the basic needs of its population.

To facilitate economic recovery, achieving political stability and reconciliation is crucial. A sustainable political solution and national reconciliation are fundamental prerequisites for economic recovery. Political stability would restore investor confidence, facilitate the return of skilled professionals, and encourage international cooperation and aid. Diversifying the economy is another essential step towards recovery. Over-reliance on oil revenues has made Libya highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices. Developing other sectors such as agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, and renewable energy can reduce the country's dependence on oil and create new job opportunities.

Rebuilding critical infrastructure is vital for economic recovery. Investment in rehabilitating oil facilities, ports, roads, and power infrastructure can restore productive capacity and enable the resumption of economic activities. International support and partnerships will be crucial in this regard. Investing in education, vocational training, and skill development programs is necessary for capacity building and human capital development. By empowering Libyan citizens with the skills needed to participate in a diversified economy, the country can strengthen its workforce and contribute to economic growth.

Lastly, the international community can play a crucial role in supporting Libya's economic recovery through financial aid, technical expertise, and diplomatic efforts. Encouraging foreign direct investment, trade partnerships, and knowledge sharing can contribute to the country's revitalization.

History

On February 15, 2011, anti-government rallies were held in Benghazi by protesters angered by the arrest of a human rights lawyer, Fethi Tarbel. The protesters called for Qaddafi to step down and for the release of political prisoners. Libyan security forces used water cannons and rubber bullets against the crowds, resulting in a number of injuries. To counter the

demonstrations further, a pro-government rally orchestrated by the Libyan authorities was broadcast on state television.

As the protests intensified, with demonstrators taking control of Benghazi and unrest spreading to Tripoli, the Libyan government began using lethal force against demonstrators. Security forces and squads of mercenaries fired live ammunition into crowds of demonstrators. Demonstrators also were attacked with tanks and artillery and from the air with warplanes and helicopter gunships. The regime restricted communications, blocked the Internet and interrupted telephone service throughout the country.

On February 21 one of Qaddafi's sons, Sayf al-Islam, gave a defiant address on state television, blaming outside agitators for the unrest and saying that further demonstrations could lead to civil war in the country. He vowed that the regime would fight "to the last bullet."

The government's sudden escalation of violence against protesters and other civilians drew international condemnation from foreign leaders and human rights organizations. It also seemed to damage the coherence of the regime, causing a number of high-level officials—including the minister of justice and a number of senior Libyan diplomats, including the Libyan ambassador to the United Nations—to resign in protest or issue statements condemning the regime.

A number of Libyan embassies around the world began to fly Libya's pre-Qaddafi flag, signaling support for the uprising. Support for Qaddafi also seemed to waver in some segments of the military; as the Libyan air force carried out attacks against demonstrators, two Libyan fighter pilots flew their jets to Malta, choosing to defect rather than obey orders to bomb Benghazi.

On February 22 Qaddafi delivered an angry, rambling speech on state television, condemning the protesters as traitors and calling on his supporters to fight them. The speech took place in the Bāb al-ʿAzīziyyah compound, Qaddafi's primary headquarters in Tripoli, in front of a building that showed extensive damage. He resisted calls to step down and vowed to remain in Libya. Although he denied having used force against protesters, he repeatedly vowed to use violence to remain in power.

Clashes continued, and Qaddafi's hold on power weakened as Libyan military units increasingly sided with the opposition against the regime. As demonstrators acquired weapons from government arms depots and joined forces with defected military units, the anti-Qaddafi movement began to

take the form of an armed rebellion. The newly armed rebel forces were able to expel most pro-Qaddafi troops from the eastern portion of Libya, including the city of Benghazi, and many western cities by February 23. The Libyan-Egyptian border was opened, allowing foreign journalists into the country for the first time since the conflict began. Pro-Qaddafi paramilitary units continued to hold the city of Tripoli, where Qaddafi and members of his family and inner circle remained.

As Qaddafi massed his forces in the Tripoli area to hold off the rebels there, his public statements seemed to indicate that he was becoming increasingly isolated and desperate. Speaking by telephone on Libyan state television on February 24, Qaddafi once again lashed out at protesters, saying that the young people at the core of the protest movement were acting under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs and that the demonstrations were being controlled by al-Qaeda.

Foreign leaders continued to condemn the violence. However, international efforts to intervene or pressure the regime to end the bloodshed were complicated by the presence of many foreign nationals in Libya still waiting to be evacuated.

The regime continued its efforts to hold the capital, launching attacks around Tripoli, some of which were repelled by rebel forces. On February 25 pro-Qaddafi gunmen in Tripoli attacked unarmed protesters and others as they emerged from mosques after Friday prayers.

International pressure for Qaddafi to step down increased as violence continued and foreign nationals were evacuated. The UN Security Council unanimously approved a measure that included exacting sanctions against the Qaddafi regime, imposing a travel ban and an arms embargo, and freezing the Qaddafi family's assets. The measure also referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The United States, the European Union (EU), and a number of other countries also imposed sanctions. On February 28 the United States announced that it had frozen at least \$30 billion in Libyan assets.

Amid continuing skirmishes as rebel forces strengthened their positions outside Tripoli, Qaddafi invited a number of Western journalists to the city in an attempt to demonstrate that the situation remained under control in the capital. In interviews he continued to blame al-Qaeda and hallucinogenic drugs for the uprising. He claimed that Western leaders who had called for him to step down had done so out of a desire to colonize Libya, and he insisted that he was still well loved by Libyans.

A rebel leadership council, formed by the merger of local rebel groups, appeared in Benghazi in early March. Known as the Transitional National Council (TNC), it declared that its aims would be to act as the rebellion's military leadership and as the representative of the Libyan opposition, provide services in rebel-held areas, and guide the country's transition to democratic government.

Conditions in Libya worsened as the armed struggle continued, and thousands of people, mostly migrant workers from Egypt and Tunisia, fled toward the borders. Governments and humanitarian organizations began to organize efforts to address worsening shortages of food, fuel, and medical supplies throughout the country.

After the rebels succeeded in taking control of eastern Libya and a number of cities in the west, the conflict appeared to enter a stalemate. The Qaddafi regime still controlled enough soldiers and weapons to hold Tripoli and to stage fresh assaults, which rebel fighters, although poorly equipped, were largely able to repel. Most fighting took place in the towns around Tripoli and in the central coastal region, where rebels and Qaddafi loyalists battled for control of the oil-export terminals on the Gulf of Sidra.

As the fighting continued, forces loyal to Qaddafi seemed to gain momentum, launching successful assaults to retake control in strategic areas around Tripoli and on the coast of the Gulf of Sidra. Attacking with fighter jets, tanks, and artillery, pro-Qaddafi forces had by March 10 driven rebel forces from Zawiyah, west of Tripoli, and from the oil-export center of Ras Lanuf. Those gains highlighted the Qaddafi loyalists' advantages in weaponry, training, and organization.

As Qaddafi appeared to gain the upper hand, the international community continued to debate possible diplomatic and military responses to the rapidly developing conflict. Countries worked to establish contact with the TNC, although only France granted it official recognition, announcing on March 10 that it would treat the council as Libya's legitimate government. International condemnation of the Qaddafi regime continued to build, and, at an emergency summit on March 11, the EU unanimously called for Qaddafi to step down. However, the international community remained divided over the possibility of military intervention—most likely by imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, a measure long requested by the rebels to prevent Qaddafi loyalists from launching air attacks. Some countries, including France and the United Kingdom, signaled their support for such an

operation, while others, including the United States and Germany, expressed their reservations, emphasizing the need for broad international consensus and warning against possible unforeseen consequences of military intervention.

The African Union (AU) rejected any military intervention in Libya, asserting that the crisis should be resolved through negotiations, whereas the Arab League passed a resolution on March 13 calling on the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya.

On March 15 Qaddafi loyalists launched a heavy assault on the eastern city of Ajdābiyā, the last large rebel-held city on the route to Benghazi. On March 17, as Qaddafi loyalists advanced on the remaining rebel positions in Benghazi and Tobruk in the east and Misurata in the west, the UN Security Council voted 10–0—with abstentions from Russia, China, Germany, India, and Brazil—to authorize military action, including imposition of a no-fly zone to protect Libyan civilians. The Qaddafi regime responded by declaring an immediate cease-fire, although there were reports that pro-Qaddafi forces continued to launch attacks after the announcement and that heavy fighting continued in Benghazi.

Beginning March 19, a coalition of U.S. and European forces with warplanes and cruise missiles attacked targets in Libya in an effort to disable Libya's air force and air defense systems so that the UN-authorized no-fly zone could be imposed. Coalition missiles struck buildings in a compound used by Qaddafi as a command centre, and in eastern Libya warplanes attacked a pro-Qaddafi armoured column positioned outside Benghazi. Emboldened by the air strikes, rebel forces once again launched an offensive to challenge pro-Qaddafi forces' hold on the oil centres on the coast. Qaddafi denounced the coalition attacks as an act of aggression against Libya and vowed to continue fighting international forces and the rebels.

Coalition spokesmen announced on March 23 that the Libyan air force had been completely disabled by coalition air strikes. However, heavy fighting continued on the ground. Pro-Qaddafi units massed around the rebel-held city of Misurata in the west and the contested city of Ajdābiyā in the east, shelling both heavily and causing significant civilian casualties. Attacks by coalition warplanes soon weakened pro-Qaddafi ground forces in eastern Libya, allowing rebels to advance west again.

On March 27 the NATO officially took command of military operations previously directed by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom in Libya. The handover came after several days of debate between NATO

countries over the limits of international military intervention; several countries had argued that the coalition's aggressive targeting of pro-Qaddafi ground forces had exceeded the mandate set by the UN Security Council to protect civilians.

On March 30 Libyan foreign minister Moussa Koussa defected, fleeing to the United Kingdom. The defection of Koussa, a former head of Libyan intelligence and a longtime member of Qaddafi's inner circle, was interpreted as a sign that support for Qaddafi among senior Libyan officials was beginning to wane.

As the fighting progressed, it began to appear that, even with NATO attacks on pro-Qaddafi forces, the Libyan rebels—a poorly armed and disorganized force with little military training—would be unable to oust Qaddafi or achieve decisive successes against Qaddafi's professional troops.

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis intensified, with an AU delegation traveling to Tripoli on April 10 to present a cease-fire plan to Qaddafi. AU representatives announced that Qaddafi had accepted the plan, although pro-Qaddafi forces continued to launch attacks on April 11. The plan was rejected by the rebel leaders on the grounds that it did not provide for Qaddafi's departure from Libya.

As the stalemate continued, the United Kingdom announced on April 19 that it would send a team of military liaison officers to Libya to advise rebel leaders on military strategy, organization, and logistics. The next day France and Italy announced that they would also send advisers. All three countries specified that their officers would not participate in fighting. The Libyan foreign minister condemned the decision to send military advisers, saying that such aid to the rebels would only prolong the conflict.

NATO attacks continued and targeted a number of sites associated with Qaddafi and members of his inner circle, drawing protests from Libyan officials who charged that NATO had adopted a strategy of trying to kill Qaddafi. His son Sayf al-Arab and three of Qaddafi's grandchildren were killed in a NATO air strike in April. In June the ICC issued arrest warrants for Qaddafi, his son Sayf al-Islam, and the Libyan intelligence chief, Abdullah Senussi, for ordering attacks against civilians during the uprising. Some observers expressed concern that the ICC's proceedings against Qaddafi would discourage him from relinquishing power voluntarily. In spite of pressure from NATO attacks, rebel advances in the eastern and western regions of Libya, and the Qaddafi regime's international isolation, Qaddafi continued to hold power in Tripoli.

After months of stalemate, the balance of power once again shifted in the rebels' favour. In August 2011 rebel forces advanced to the outskirts of Tripoli, taking control of strategic areas, including the city of Zawiyah, the site of one of Libya's largest oil refineries. Rebels soon advanced into Tripoli, establishing control over some areas of the capital on August 22. As rebel fighters battled pro-Qaddafi forces for control of Tripoli, Qaddafi's whereabouts were unknown. The next day rebel forces appeared to gain the upper hand, capturing the Bāb al-ʿAzīziyyah compound, Qaddafi's headquarters. Rebels raised Libya's pre-Qaddafi flag over the compound as jubilant crowds destroyed symbols of Qaddafi. =Fighting between rebels and loyalists continued in a few areas of Tripoli.

By early September rebel forces had solidified their control of Tripoli, and the TNC began to transfer its operations to the capital. Qaddafi, effectively forced from power, remained in hiding, occasionally issuing defiant audio messages. Rebel forces focused their attention on the few remaining cities under loyalist control, attempting to use negotiations to persuade loyalist commanders to surrender peacefully and avoid a bloody ground assault. When negotiations failed, rebel troops began to push into the cities of Sirte and Banī Walīd, engaging in heavy fighting with loyalists. The TNC achieved new international legitimacy on September 15 when the UN General Assembly voted to recognize it as the representative of the Libyan people in the UN. On October 20 Qaddafi was discovered and killed by rebel fighters in his hometown, Sirte, as they fought to solidify their control of the city.

The TNC struggled to establish a functional government and exert its authority in the months that followed the fall of the Qaddafi regime. Local rebel militias that had fought autonomously during the uprising, especially those in western Libya, were reluctant to submit to an interim government formed in eastern Libya with little input from the rest of the country and were suspicious of some TNC officials' past ties to the Qaddafi regime. The militias refused to disarm, and skirmishes between rival militias over territory were common.

Current Situation

After five months of UN-brokered political talks between Libyan stakeholders, the country's House of Representatives swore in on March 15 a new interim authority, the Government of National Unity (GNU).

As of October, the first round of a two-round presidential election was due to take place on. Parliamentary elections were due to take place 52 days after the first round of presidential elections. The country reeled from continued mass displacement, dangers caused by newly-laid landmines, and the destruction of critical infrastructure, including healthcare and schools. Hundreds of people remain missing, including many civilians, and the authorities made grim discoveries of mass graves containing dozens of bodies that remain unidentified.

Migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in Libya faced arbitrary detention, during which many experienced ill-treatment, sexual assault, forced labor, and extortion by groups linked with the Government of National Unity's Interior Ministry, members of armed groups, smugglers, and traffickers.

- 1. Political Process and Elections:** UN-facilitated political talks involving 75 Libyan stakeholders at the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) since November 2020 culminated in the nomination of the GNU. The new interim authority replaced the Government of National Accord and the Interim Government in eastern Libya.

While members of a joint military commission known as the 5+5 were negotiating the merging of Libyan fighters into a unified force, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), the armed group under the command of General Khalifa Hiftar, remained in control of eastern Libya and parts of the south.

The GNU's core mandate is to conduct presidential and parliamentary elections on December 24 and to implement a ceasefire agreement from October 2020 between parties. As of October, the House of Representatives (HOR) passed a law for electing a president on December 24, and a separate law on electing a new parliament, paving the way for national elections. The High Council of the State, mandated to approve elections laws per political agreements, contested the legislation citing lack of consultation.

Libya remains without a permanent constitution, with only the 2011 constituent covenant in force. A draft constitution proposed by the

elected Libyan Constitution Drafting Assembly in July 2017 has yet to be put to a national referendum. As of October, no date had been scheduled for the referendum.

The constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court has remained shuttered since 2014 due to armed conflict. The lack of a constitutional court to review and revoke legislation deemed unconstitutional, including elections-related legislation, only deepens Libya's constitutional crisis.

2. **Armed Conflict and War Crimes:** The October 2020 ceasefire agreement between the former Government of National Accord and Hiftar's LAAF stipulated the departure of all foreign fighters from the country. According to the UN mission in Libya, as of September, thousands of foreign fighters from Syria, Russia, Chad, and Sudan, including members of private military companies, remained in Libya.

Since the discovery of mass graves in the town Tarhouna after the end of the armed conflict in June 2020, Libyan authorities said they had retrieved more than 200 bodies from more than 555 mass graves as of October. The Public Authority for Search and Identification of Missing Persons as of October had yet to confirm how many individuals were identified based on DNA matching or other means, such as clothing.

The use of landmines during the armed conflict in Tripoli and surroundings, reportedly by the Wagner Group, a Russian government-linked company, has killed and maimed dozens of people and deterred families from returning to their homes. In September, eight members of one family were injured when a landmine exploded near their home in southern Tripoli. According to a March report by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, internationally banned antipersonnel landmines manufactured in Russia and never before seen in Libya were brought into the country and used in Libya in 2019 and early 2020.

3. **Judicial System and Detainees:** Libya's criminal justice system remained dysfunctional in some areas due to years of fighting and political divisions. Where prosecutions and trials took place, there were serious due process concerns and military courts continued to try civilians. Judges, prosecutors and lawyers remained at risk of harassment and attacks by armed groups. Libyan courts are in a

limited position to resolve election disputes, including registration and results.

Libya's Justice Ministry as of August held 12,300 detainees, including women and children, in 27 prisons under their control and other detention facilities "acknowledged" by the GNU, according to the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Forty-one percent of the detainees were held in arbitrary, long-term pre-trial detention, according to UNSMIL. Armed groups held thousands of others in irregular detention facilities. Prisons in Libya are marked by inhumane conditions such as overcrowding and ill treatment.

Libyan authorities in March deported to Tunisia 10 Tunisian women and 14 children held in Libyan prisons, some for more than 5 years, for having ties to suspected members of ISIS.

The Libyan Supreme Court in May annulled a 2015 verdict against Gaddafi-era officials whose prosecution and trials for their roles during the 2011 revolution had been marred by due process violations. Muammar Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam was among nine sentenced to death. The Supreme Court ordered a retrial, yet at time of writing none of the defendants had appeared in court.

Authorities in western Libya on September 5 released eight detainees linked with former leader Muammar Gaddafi held since 2011, including one of Gaddafi's sons, Al-Saadi, held since 2014 after his extradition from Niger. A Tripoli appeals court in April 2018 had cleared Al-Saadi of all charges, including first degree murder, yet he remained held in arbitrary detention and subjected to ill-treatment for three more years.

4. **International Justice and the ICC:** The International Criminal Court's (ICC) former prosecutor in May reported to the Security Council that members of her office had traveled to Libya and interviewed witnesses but she did not announce any new arrest warrants against Libyan suspects.

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, wanted by the ICC since 2011 for serious crimes during the 2011 uprising, remains a fugitive and Libya remains under legal obligation to surrender him to the Hague. Al-Tuhamy Khaled, former head of the Libyan Internal Security Agency and wanted by the ICC for crimes he allegedly committed in 2011, reportedly died in Cairo in February; Mahmoud el-Werfalli, a commander linked with the

LAAF and wanted by the ICC for multiple killings in eastern Libya, was reportedly killed in March in Benghazi by unidentified armed men.

Khalifa Hiftar faces three separate lawsuits filed in a US District Court in Virginia by families who allege their loved ones were killed or tortured by his forces in Libya after 2014. In July, the judge ruled that Hiftar cannot claim head-of-state-immunity in his defense.

The Libya Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) established by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in June 2020 to investigate alleged violations and abuses since 2016 only became fully operational in June due to delays caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. On October 3, the FFM issued its report, which found that “several parties to the conflicts violated International Humanitarian Law and potentially committed war crimes.” On October 11, the HRC renewed the mission’s mandate for an additional nine months to allow completion of its investigations.

5. **Freedom of Association:** Libya’s Penal Code levies severe punishments, including the death penalty, for establishing “unlawful” associations, and prohibits Libyans from joining or establishing international organizations unless they receive government permission.

Presidential Decree 286 on regulating NGOs, passed in 2019 by the former Presidential Council of the GNA, includes burdensome registration requirements and stringent regulations on funding. Fundraising inside and outside Libya is prohibited. The decree mandates onerous advance notification for group members wanting to attend events. The Tripoli-based Commission of Civil Society, tasked with registering and approving civic organizations, has sweeping powers to inspect documents and cancel the registration and work permits of domestic and foreign organizations.

6. **Freedom of Speech and Expression:** Authorities in eastern Libya on September 11 released freelance photojournalist Ismail Abuzreiba al-Zway, who had been detained since December 2018. In May 2020, a Benghazi military court had sentenced him in a secret trial to 15 years in prison for “communicating with a TV station that supports terrorism.” The General Command of the LAAF reportedly granted al-Zway amnesty, but the conditions of his release were not publicized.

In October, the Libyan parliament passed a cybercrime law that appears to contain overbroad provisions and draconian punishments including fines and imprisonment that could violate freedom of speech. A number of provisions in Libyan laws unduly restrict freedom of speech and expression including criminal penalties for defamation of officials, the Libyan nation and flag, and insulting religion. The penal code stipulates the death penalty for “promoting theories or principles” that aim to overthrow the political, social or economic system.

On 5 August 2014, Warshefana forces captured Camp 27, a training base west of Tripoli. Warshefana armed groups have also been involved in a tribal conflict with the neighboring Zawia city since 2011. Zawia has allied with Libya Dawn since August 2014, although its commitment to Libya Dawn is reportedly wavering.

Past International Action

International pressure for Qaddafi to step down increased as violence continued and foreign nationals were evacuated. The UN Security Council unanimously approved a measure that included exacting sanctions against the Qaddafi regime, imposing a travel ban and an arms embargo, and freezing the Qaddafi family’s assets. The measure also referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The United States, the European Union (EU), and a number of other countries also imposed sanctions. On February 28 the United States announced that it had frozen at least \$30 billion in Libyan assets. Many states and supranational bodies condemned the Qaddafi regime over its attacks on civilian targets within the country. Virtually all Western countries cut off diplomatic relations with Qaddafi’s government over an aerial bombing campaign in February and March, and a number of other countries led by Peru and Botswana did likewise.

The regime's use of the Libyan Air Force to strike civilians led to the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 to create a Libyan no-fly zone on 17 March, though several countries involved in the resolution's enforcement have also carried out regular strike missions to degrade the offensive capacity of the Libyan Army and destroy the regime's command and control capabilities, effectively acting in de facto support of anti-Qaddafi forces on the ground.

Many members of the international community, including the United Nations, the Arab League, and the African Union, explicitly recognized the anti-Qaddafi National Transitional Council as Libya's legitimate representative, with many of those countries explicitly describing it as the legal interim government of the country due to the perceived loss of legitimacy on the part of Gaddafi's regime.

Many states also either issued travel advisories or attempted evacuations. Some evacuations were successful in either going to Malta or via land borders to Egypt or Tunisia; other attempts were hindered by tarmac damage at Benghazi's airport or refusals of permission to land in Tripoli. There were also several solidarity protests in other countries that were mostly composed of Libyan expatriates. Financial markets around the world had adverse reactions to the instability with oil prices rising to a two-and-a-half-year high.

Case Study

Seven years after the so-called Arab Spring reached Libya, the Northern African country remains in a state of dramatic instability. Indeed, a complex civil war with numerous internal and external conflict parties threatens to break up the country. The ongoing conflict has caused a dire humanitarian crisis to the detriment of the Libyan people. In addition, the lack of a central authority controlling the country's vast territory and long borders has allowed militias to establish a flourishing human trafficking and smuggling business and terrorist organizations including affiliates of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State to use Libyan territory as a safe haven or even establish partial territorial control.

In early 2011, a popular uprising against the regime of long-term dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi quickly turned into a civil war with numerous militias forming a loose, heterogeneous anti government coalition. In March of that year, an international military alliance headed by NATO intervened in the conflict. By the end of October, Qaddafi had been killed and his regime had fallen. However, despite having reached their common goal, the ragbag anti-Qaddafi coalition failed to agree on a common political vision for the country's future. The various militias refused to disarm and began to establish semi-autonomous regions within the state, challenging the authority of the newly established central government.

In 2014, growing conflict between the manifold Libyan factions escalated into another civil war. For much of the next two years, two different bodies claimed to be the legitimate representative of the Libyan people:

The internationally recognized parliament,

The “House of Representatives” (HoR) based in the Eastern Libyan city of Tobruk with its “Interim Government” located in Al Beida and

The Islamist dominated “General National Congress” based in the capital city of Tripoli with its “National Salvation Government” (NSG).

In December 2015, under the auspices of the United Nations, representatives and supporters of the two competing parliaments and governments agreed on the establishment of a unity government. This “Government of National Accord” (GNA), headed by Fayeze al-Sarraj, was quickly endorsed by the UN Security Council and recognized by the international community. However, keeping the limited democratic legitimization as well as the limited influence of both bodies in mind, the participants in the negotiations were far from representative for the society of Libya. In the spring of 2016, the GNA gained sufficient support among the manifold factions and militias in the greater Tripoli area to allow it to relocate from Tunisia to Libya’s capital. Among those militias were most previous supporters of the Islamist dominated NSG.

However, a core group around (NSG) Prime Minister Khalifa Ghwell continuously refuses to give up power and support the unity government. This is also true for the Tobruk based parliament and its military leader, the head of the “Libyan National Army”, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. Hence, Libya currently has three competing governments, each supported by more or less loose and shaky alliances of numerous local and regional militias.

The toppling of the Qaddafi regime rekindled old societal conflicts and gave rise to new ones:

conflicts between tribes, ethnic groups, different regions and towns, federalists and unionists, seculars and Islamists, different branches of the latter, old elites and rebels as well as active fighters and political leaders of the revolution. A main subject matter of the many overlapping conflicts is control of natural resources, primarily oil and gas as well as of criminal businesses.

Since the revolution of 2011, several radical Islamist and jihadi factions established themselves, gained increasing support, and, as in the case of

Islamic State's Libyan offshoot, succeeded temporarily in establishing territorial control over parts of the country.

The Libyan civilian population suffers significantly in the ongoing conflict. Non-combatants regularly become collateral damage in armed struggles and are repeatedly targeted solely based on their tribal, ethnic, or regional origin. Radical Islamist and jihadist militant groups force civilians in their areas of influence to follow strict codes of conduct and punish any noncompliance with great brutality. Hence, in parts of Libya, basic freedoms, particularly for women, see greater restrictions than during the Qaddafi era.

Due to the considerable reduction of oil exports, Libya's main source of income, a high unemployment rate, great disparity in the distribution of wealth, the non-existence of a functional national welfare system, and recurrent sieges of residential areas as a result of civil war dynamics, food security and access to health care are severely restricted in large parts of Libya.

The collapse of the Libyan state structure and the ongoing civil war have had significant repercussions beyond Libya's territory. Refugee streams are no longer halted at Libya's southern border, due to civil war many Libyans themselves fled the country, and people smugglers take advantage of the chaos and send thousands of migrants on the dangerous and often fatal trip across the Mediterranean.

Small arms and light weapons, looted from the arsenals of al-Gaddafi's military, have found their way to conflict zones stretching from Mali to Syria and Gaza. In addition, Libya has become both a breeding ground and a training base for internationally active jihadi terrorist groups, negatively affecting security in neighboring states and beyond.

Early on, external actors greatly influenced the course of the Libyan civil war. Had it not been for the NATO-led intervention, the heterogeneous opposition would not have been able to topple strongman al-Gaddafi. In the post-Gaddafi period, several regional and global players got involved in Libya in trying to bring about a conflict solution or by granting different conflict factions varying degrees of political, financial, and military support. Geostrategic, other security, and economic interests are key motivators behind such actions.

In 2015, UN special envoy Martin Kobler managed to broker the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) that aimed to establish a foundation for the consolidation of the country under a “Government of National Accord”. Key weaknesses of this agreement and its subsequent “implementation” are the non-representative selection of its negotiators, the failure to address the deep mistrust between Libya’s three historic regions and the ignorance of realities on the ground.

European states are interested in a stable Libya under a consolidated leadership in order to curb migrant streams towards European shores as well as terrorist activities in and launched from Libyan territory. Economic interests with regard to Libya’s vast oil reserves are of significance as well. American strategic interests regarding Libya are by and large focused on counter terrorism only.

Key EU countries and the United States consider Field Marshall Haftar a spoiler in the process of conflict settlement. However, whether Haftar and the HoR support al-Sarraj and his GNA or not, is of limited relevance. Sarraj is focused on his own survival among the militias in the capital, a struggle in which neither the HoR nor Haftar can be of much help.

Egypt has for years been militarily involved in the civil war in support of General Haftar’s self-proclaimed fight against Islamist factions in Libya. To a lesser degree, this is also true for the United Arab Emirates. Russia has close ties with Haftar as well, establishing a partnership with Libya’s possible future strongman, while officially endorsing the LPA. On the other hand, Turkey and Qatar have granted support to Islamist factions inter alia by supplying them with arms and providing logistic support.

The case of the Libyan civil war is highly complex, and a solution seems to be a long way away. However, the regional and supra-regional repercussions of ongoing instability in the Northern African state would be too grave for the international state community to stand idly by.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer

1. What are the major economic implications of the crisis in Libya and how has the decline in oil production affected the country's economy?

2. What is the extent of the damage to critical infrastructure and how does it hinder economic recovery?
3. What are the challenges faced by the private sector in Libya and how can it be revitalized?
4. How has the humanitarian crisis impacted the economy, and what measures can be taken to alleviate its effects?
5. What are the prerequisites for achieving political stability and national reconciliation in Libya?
6. What are the potential sectors for economic diversification in Libya and how can they contribute to recovery?
7. What are the key steps required for the reconstruction and development of critical infrastructure?
8. How can capacity building and human capital development contribute to Libya's economic recovery?
9. What role can the international community play in supporting Libya's economic recovery?
10. How can foreign direct investment, trade partnerships, and knowledge sharing contribute to revitalizing Libya's economy?